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ABSTRACT 
 
 New technologies of power are taking control of body and life. Historically, refugee 
camps were produced as a result of the sociopolitical effects of new technologies of power.  
In some instances, refugee camps have been conceptualized as “total institutions” where 
bodies are disciplined and where control is an integral and defining component of the 
structure of the institution and its daily routine. In many ways, the space of Palestinian camps 
in Lebanon has signified a mechanism of control for multiple political powers. These camps 
have had fixed boundaries since their establishment. The configuration of the boundary 
reflects the power of Lebanese state over the camp residents and its means of surveillance 
and control over the spaces of the camps. The refugees are expected to remain within their 
boundary where Lebanese army checkpoints can control what goes into the camp. It is an 
environment under continuous potential siege. Manifestation of living under potential siege is 
displayed differently among the three camps that I chose to discuss in this thesis; namely 
Shatila, Nahr Al-Bared and ‘Ain al-Hilweh. These three camps show different conditions of 
integration with the spaces outside their respective boundaries. The spatial characteristics of 
these boundaries defined different degrees of spatial assimilation of the camps within the 
surrounding space the Lebanese state. Navigating through Giorgio Agamben’s “state of 
exception” and Michel Agier’s “extraterritoriality” as theoretical frameworks of the space of 
the camp, this thesis maps the political agency of Palestinians in relationship to the process of 
urbanization of camp border in order to assert the spatial exclusivity of these two frameworks 
within the conditions of the Palestinian refugee in Lebanon.  
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INTRODUCTION 
"UNHCR's annual Global Trends” reports that the worldwide displacement in 2014 
was at the highest level ever recorded. This report shows the number of people forcibly 
displaced at the end of 2014 had risen to a staggering 59.5 million compared to 51.2 million a 
year earlier and 37.5 million a decade ago. Globally, one in every 122 humans is now either a 
refugee, internally displaced, or seeking asylum. If this was the population of a country, it 
would be the world's 24th biggest. Around 25% of the whole refugee population worldwide 
live in camps. As a result of the Syrian civil war that started in 2011, more than 4.8 million 
Syrians are refugees and 6.6 million are displaced within Syria. Only 500,000 of these 
refugees live in camps, while others are considered urban refugees who live in towns and 
cities and (UNHCR, 2016). Some of the camps that were established after the beginning of 
the Syrian war have transformed extensively, such as the Zaatari camp in Jordan, which was 
established in 2012. This camp started as a series of tents to shelter 15,000 refugees but by 
March 2016 around 80,000 Syrian refugees live there. The camp is gradually turning to a 
permanent settlement with all components of a city. With growing refugee crisis, these 
sudden human settlements signal the future of urbanization, where places, which were 
created in emergency situations become permanent settlements. 
Even though this phenomenon is not quiet new, it is barely recognized as a form of 
urbanization. Palestinian refugee camps are the future of all camps that are “born each day in 
the world” (Agier 2012). With more than 65 years of existence, Palestinian refugee camps in 
the Middle East are the best places to study this phenomenon. One third of the five million 
Palestinian refugees in the World, more than 1.5 million, live in 58 registered camps across 
the Middle East (UNRWA). These camps were initially erected as temporary spaces to settle 
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Palestinians who were forced to leave their homeland in 1948. Formation of these camps 
materialized under complicated socio-political circumstances. The space of the Palestinian 
refugee camp have been studied across multiple disciplines where in some cases they are 
considered as informal settlements embodying conditions that are usually associated with 
informality. But there is lack of enough research in architecture and urban design, which 
specifically studies the urbanization of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon in conjunction with 
the physical and political space of Lebanon. The spaces of the camps are registered through 
multiple physical and social boundaries, which have been transforming during the 
Palestinians prolonged presence in Lebanon. In this research, I will discuss the production of 
the Palestinian refugee camps in association with the socio-political conditions in Lebanon 
with a focus on the relationship of the camps’ boundaries to the changing political agency of 
the refugees. 
Giorgio Agamben considers that modern states retain the camps under the “state of 
exception” status to continue their existence, as a form of biopolitics, as a materialization of 
control of the body by the state or power. In fact, camps are considered spaces to put 
refugees in a state of bare life or a human without political life (Agamben 1998). 
Furthermore, Michel Agier, who conducted extensive research on long-lasting camps as city-
camps over the Middle East and Africa, sees camps as “the most advanced form of a global 
treatment of stigmatized identities and undesirable groups.” for Agier, camps are 
“laboratories which still unconceived forms of urbanism are germinating” (Agier 2008: 61). 
Since the 1990s, the State of Lebanon (hereafter refer to as the State) has been 
adopting strategies and policies to control the political and social activities of Palestinians in 
Lebanon. Being the physical barrier that marks the spaces of the camp and controls its 
3 
 
relationship to its context, camp borders also represent the ongoing battle over the formation 
of the Palestinian political agency and the attempt of the State to control it. While most 
studies on Palestinian camps associate conditions of extraterritoriality, as articulated by 
Agier, with a state of exceptions, as articulated by Agamben, (Hanafi 2008, Hanafi and Long 
2010,  Walby, and Hanafi 2013, Ramadan 2009), my argument is that the extraterritoriality 
of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon provides spaces for political agency for 
Palestinian refugees within the “state of exception” space of the Lebanese state that denies 
the refugees basic civic rights. The history of Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon shows 
a continuous struggle to assert the refugees as political subjects through occupational, 
military, social and spatial means. The camp borders are central to this struggle, albeit with 
different manifestations, in order to protect the presence of the Palestinian space of the camp 
by designating it as extraterritorial within the space of the Lebanese state.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Foucault’s book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison represented the 
historical shift of carceral institutions and punishment practices from mid eighteenth to mid 
nineteenth century, especially with regards to the French penal system. He showed how from 
that period display of power of the sovereigns, and in the system of surveillance, constraint, 
control, examination and education of prisoners changed. The book, although specifically 
focused on prisons, have hints at the other disciplinary institutions, such as schools, asylums, 
hospitals, barracks and factories, where the same technologies of behavior were applied 
(Foucault 1997). Later in the History of Sexuality, Foucault stated “For a long time, one of 
the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death.” 
(Foucault 19878: 119, Agamben 1998: 55). He described the process that politics turn into 
biopolitics when natural life began to be included in the mechanism and calculation of State 
power (Agamben 1998: 10). However, Foucault had not mentioned the exemplary places of 
modern biopolitics: the concentration camp and the structure of the great totalitarian states of 
the twentieth century (Ibid). Foucault notion of “disciplinary spaces and practices” should 
take into account, not in terms of order of the spaces but in terms of sociopolitical effects that 
different kinds of spatial regime might be expected to produce” (Peteet 2005:29). Spaces of 
the refugee camps have been creating under these circumstances. 
Agamben built his argument based on Foucault notion of biopolitics that is “inclusion 
of man’s natural life in the mechanisms and calculation of power” in modern age. He sees the 
biopolitics as missing element in Arendt’s studies that pertained to the structure of 
totalitarian states and defined camps as “the supreme goal” of all of them while she saw the 
camps as locations for testing total domination (Agamben 1998:10). Inspired by these two 
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scholars, Agamben introduced concept of “state of exception” to explain formation of camps 
in modern political system of twentieth century.  He considers camp as “hidden paradigm of 
the political space of modernity” as “pure, absolute, impassible biopolitical space” (Agamben 
1998:72). In classical time biological life (zoe) and political life (bios) kept separately but 
through politico-juridical order of the modern era “body” entered into the realm of politics 
and it was the beginning of new political order of the West. He explains how the French 
Declaration of 1789 was collapse of ancient regime and it gave birth to national sovereignty 
and connected the birthplace to the nation-state. Zoe was politicized by declaration of rights 
and natural life included in polis. Refugees are crisis for modern sovereignty because they 
question this relation of “man and citizen, nativity and nationality” (Agamben 1998: 131). 
The refugees show “bare life” in a political domain because in condition of refugees, the 
rights of citizen are set apart from the citizenship. While condition of refugees has had 
political origins, various international committee and organizations have been failing to find 
a resolution for this worldwide crisis because they have “solely humanitarian and social” 
mission rather than political. Agamben questions the space of camps and “its juridical-
political structure” and he depicts camps as places that “are born not out of ordinary law but 
out of a state of exception and material law” (Agamben 1998: 167). 
Although Agamben has focused on Nazi concentration camps, his notion of the “state 
of exception” portrayed the loss of political being as a state of bare life. Since World War I, 
some governments had created laws that have given them the permission of “denaturalization 
and denationalization” of native people (Agamben 1998: 132). The mass statelessness that 
happened with these laws indicate a key turning point when the native nations of people and 
citizen take away from the new nation-state way of political order.  An example of this is the 
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Palestinians refugee crisis. With the establishment of state of Israel, this power excluded 
Arab Palestinians from its population, making them stateless. Israel created a situation which 
those people prefer exile in hope of survival rather than staying in their homeland in fear of 
death. Thus, consequences of being statelessness, is stateless population with no right on 
citizenship and civil rights.  
In condition of being stateless, these people need a place out of that nation-state 
which excluded them. In fact, lacking autonomous space within the political order of the 
nation-state for a person in the state of bare life is evident. The status of refugee is considered 
a temporary condition that should lead either to naturalization or to repatriation. After one of 
these solution, they will be eligible to obtain nationality to get basic civil rights. None of 
these have happened to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon yet. In the law of the nation-state, 
humans do not have permanent status as just being human. It means without belonging to a 
particular nation-state they will not have basic civil rights. That is how Arendt explained the 
problem of the refugee "the decline of the nation-state and the end of the rights of man" 
(Arendt 1961:267). There are a lot of examples of internment camps, concentration camps, 
and extermination camps which were created at the end of the 19th century and during World 
War I and II. Those concentration camps were spaces to keep denationalized and 
denaturalized people, under control of the sovereigns (Agamben 1994). Thus, based on 
Agamben’s notion of “state of exception”, this happens when humans are obstructed from 
being a political citizen with civil rights.  
While accepting the state of exception status of camps, Michel Agier defines the 
spatiality of the camps based on his anthropological studies in camps across South America, 
Middle East and Africa. Through multiple case studies, Agier had explored everyday life in 
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the refugee camps and described how a state of long-lasting instability and ongoing suffering 
characterized the life in camps (Agier 86). He defines camps as temporary spaces for 
displaced population and as “policing measure” rather than a product of a rescue effort. To 
him, the camp is the nation-state control response to the entry of a displaced population 
following civil war or violent conflicts. These nation-states are trying to restrict refugee 
population from their political and official domain. There is no “outside or separate physical 
space” for them when they do not belong to that nation-state thus camps are “outside-sites” 
which confine refugees. Confrontation of refugee flows and rejecting their citizen right at the 
same time create “artificial and never totally empty spaces” that are “extraterritorial and 
exceptional spaces” (Agier, 2008:170).  
Emergency circumstances and its unusual character explains the existence of the 
camps but over the long term these factors reproduce themselves. Camps are “extra 
territorial” spaces that are established in a place other than their residents’ nation-state. “They 
are constitutive of a reality that goes beyond the existence of each particular one, and that is 
developing a global reality” (Ibid: 65, 71). To clarify his definition, Agier explains how he 
had to get permission of entry to a camp in Kenya or Zambia from international 
organizations in Paris, Brussels or Geneva (Ibid: 65). So all the gateways, checkpoints, entry, 
etc. indicate the transition into a different state and rights. Refugees do not have citizenship 
of the country that they left or the country they are relocating into. They usually do not have 
work permission or sometimes permission of moving freely in the host country out of the 
camps’ borders. Refugees live inside the camps in a situation of exception (ibid: 71-.81).  
However, this situation does not apply to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, even 
though camps are in a state of exception within Lebanese territory. These extraterritoriality 
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spaces, especially with the Cairo accord conditions, create a space of different citizenship for 
them as a political body with its representation and administrative structure, even military 
forces. Despite their exclusion Palestinians were able to produce the space of the camps by 
appropriating them based on their daily life. These spaces in most of the cases are like high 
density vibrant urban areas which are not town or city. Agier uses the term “camp-city” to 
describe the living environment of refugees (Agier 2002:322). When refugee conditions 
become more permanent because of the continuation of war or unresolved conflicts, camps 
turn into space more than temporary camps. Agier suggests “city-camp” in two senses. First 
because of possibilities of creating new identity through daily life and second a space in 
terms of urban sociability or even a political space or polis. (Based on Arendt, social 
relationship is the place politics would happen and lack of politics will disconnect all humans 
like being in a “desert”). He highlights when “a camp that has existed for five years is no 
longer a row of tent. It can resemble a shantytown, and it can also remind us of an 
ethnographic museum where people try, with the material they find in the camp, to 
reconstruct their native habitat, for better or worse (ibid: 172). He sees camps comparable 
places to the cities however they are not cities. The potential of a nourishing economy as well 
as social relation and effort for creating identity especially for prolonged camps, could turn a 
camp to an urban area (a space like city but still not city). Palestinian refugee camps in 
Lebanon are “city-camps” with a strong unifying identity and a political space. Depending on 
their location to other urban areas, camps in Lebanon had different impact on the production 
of Lebanese space.  
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To understand how refugees appropriate their living environment, notion of “the 
production of space” is helpful. Lefebvre discusses three aspects of space: perceived, 
conceived, and lived space:  
1. Perceived space: "The spatial practice of a society secretes that society's space; it 
propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as 
it masters and appropriates it." (Lefebvre 1991:38). This is physical place that spatial practice 
occurs.  
2. Conceived space: "Conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, 
technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific 
bent; all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived." (Ibid: 
38) That is the realm of architects, planners and other professions that produce the space.   
3. Lived space "Space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols." (ibid: 
39). In other words social place and the space which dwellers justify it based on daily life.  
These three pillars relate to each other and every space consists of these while one 
might be more observable and the other less. Likewise, space of the camps comprises these 
three aspects. In reality during their presence in Lebanon, while refugees build their living 
space (lived space), many external forces (conceived and perceived space) enforce 
themselves over the formation of space. 
Refugee camps are one of the outcomes of new form of sovereigns when mechanism 
of power include man’s natural life. In this new form, there is no space for stateless people 
outside the nation-state thus camps as extra territorial spaces settle these people. Host 
community usually consider refugees as temporary and keep them in the state of bare life, 
without political rights or in state of exception. However, long duration of living in the 
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camps, give refugees the opportunity of creating agency trough daily practices. Indeed, 
agency or political agency is embodiment of endeavor over civil rights to not being in the 
state of bare life. The confrontation of the State and refugees regarding state of bare life in 
case of Palestinian refugees spatially manifested in condition of the camps’ borders. Build on 
this theories, in this thesis I will discuss the relationship between borders of three 
Palestinians camps in Lebanon with political agency of refugees.  
Political agency is represented through political and social activities that could be a 
part of the daily life of Palestinians in the camps. Political agency would happen in forms of 
collective actions such as strong presence of political parties, protests, strikes, battles, and 
informal commercial activities. I will explain how the presence of the PLO created an 
opportunity for forming an agency of Palestinians which was later legitimized by the Cairo 
accord. With this agreement, the camps became extraterritorial spaces that were 
internationally recognized as spaces that that belonged to the Palestinians, even though they 
were located in the state of Lebanon. When the PLO had to leave Lebanon, the condition of 
agency changed for Palestinians. Using the data from three different case studies of 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, I will discuss the situation of the camps’ boundaries 
in relation to the political agency of Palestinians regarding the state of exception and 
extraterritoriality of the camps.  
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HISTORY OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON 
A series of events resulted in Palestinian refugee crisis that have more profound 
incentive than the mere events. The first event that contributed to the Palestinian refugee 
crisis was the creation of the state of Israel. This caused the Palestinians to lose their land, 
country, and nationality as they were displaced. Palestinians were denationalized and those 
who fled to other countries became refugees. Palestinians remember this day as nakbah (in 
Arabic means disaster) when approximately 80 percent of Arab habitants left the country as a 
consequence of Arab-Israel War in 1948.  Since nakbah, Palestinian refugees were 
distributed between Jordan, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Syria. Some of refugees 
lived inside the registered camps while others lived outside of them. Socio-economic 
conditions of the camps are widely different depending on the host country and urban or rural 
setting.  
For the sake of tracing the changing meaning of the camp borders, the history of 
camps in Lebanon can be divided into four phases. The first phase spanned from 1948 to 
1968, which took place during the early years of exile. From 1968 to 1982, the presence of 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and forming the resistance movement had started 
a new era for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. With the fall of the PLO in 1982 to the end of 
the civil war in 1990 another chapter closed for them. Since 1991, Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon are living under the socio-political and financial hardship. Here I will use these 
phases to narrate the history of their presence in Lebanon in relation to political agency of 
Palestinian refugees. 
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First phase: 1948-1968, years of adaptation and restriction   
During 1948 almost 750,000 Palestinians were being uprooted from their land and 
became refugees. They fled to neighboring countries where around 100,000 of them settled 
in Lebanon (UNRWA, 2016; Hanafi et al., 2012). During the time that Palestinians arrived in 
Lebanon, the country had its own dilemmas. In 1943, Lebanon became independent from 
France. Although they gained independence, Lebanon as a nation struggled over their 
national identity.  The struggle over national identity was among three main groups, which 
were the Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shi’a. Because Palestinians were mostly Sunni, the 
Lebanese government considered them a threat to the nation’s stability especially with the 
fragile relation between the Muslims and Maronites. Hence, the Lebanese government did 
not grant citizenship to Palestinians and they remained refugees. 
The first decade, Palestinians were traumatized by nakbah, and they were waiting for 
the opportunity to go back to their homes in Palestine.  The first ten years, the Lebanese 
government and population welcomed Palestinians. Because of this, refugees had freedom of 
expression, which allowed Palestinians to be involved in social and political activities. But 
from 1958 with the presidency of Camille Chamoun and the rise of Arab nationalistic 
movement in the region, the situation had changed (Suleiman 1999: 67). In the fear of 
forming any political organization, all aspects of Palestinian life were monitored and 
controlled. Deuxieme Bureau as the Lebanese intelligence, monitored any movement within 
the camps. Refugees lost their freedom of expression and all the political and social activities 
were controlled (Ibid). 
Jaber Suleiman divided this phase to two phases of 1948-58 and 1958-69. He called 
the first ten years the “adaptation and hope” phase as the Lebanese welcomed Palestinians. 
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The second phase was defined as “first crackdown and covert activity” which started with 
Arab nationalist rebellion against Chamounin in 1958 and presidency of General Fouad 
Chehab. It was during this decade that marked the rise of the Palestinian resistance 
movement (Suleiman 1999:67). During the second phase, in 1951 the Central Committee for 
Refugee Affairs was set up by the State to control the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Later 
in 1959 the committee was replaced with the Department of Palestinian Affair under the 
Ministry of Interior. The tasks of department were as follow: 
“Liaising with international relief agencies in Lebanon to ensure relief, shelter, 
education and health and social services for the refugees; receiving applications for passports 
for departure from Lebanon, scrutinizing these applications, and submitting comments to the 
relevant departments of the Surete Generale (security police); registering personal documents 
relating to birth, marriage, divorce, annulment, change of residency, and change of sect or 
religion, following confirmation of their validity; approving applications for the reunion of 
dispersed families in accordance with the texts and directives of the Arab League and after 
consultation with the Armistice Commission; and approving exemption from customs duties 
on the personal or household belongings of persons entering Palestine for purposes of family 
reunion under the previous item” (Souheil Al Natour 1997: 362). Moreover, decree of 3909 
of 1960 created the Higher Authority for Palestinians Affairs which was responsible for 
overseeing political and economic concerns relating to Palestinians and Arab-Israel conflict 
(Ibid, 361-363).  
The wave of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East and lack of enough humanitarian 
aid from the host countries had created a human disaster. Thus, United Nations Relief and 
Work Agency for Palestinian Refugee in the Near East (UNRWA) was established by United 
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Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to provide relief and 
employment in the region for Palestinian refugees (Ghandour 2013; Peteet 2005; UNRWA 
2015). Prior to UNRWA, relief works was conducted by organizations like the International 
Committee for the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and the American Friends 
Service Committee. UNRWA became fully operational in 1950 with a mandate to: “carry 
out, in collaboration with local governments, the direct relief and works programs as 
recommended by the Economic Survey Mission and to consult with interested Near Eastern 
governments concerning measures to be taken in preparation for the cessation of international 
assistance for relief and works projects” (Besson 1997: 231). 
However, UNRWA’s program with the aim of social and economic reintegration of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were dismantled soon by the Lebanese state in an effort to 
marginalize Palestinians and to prevent integration into the Lebanese society. Furthermore, 
early in 1950s UNRWA associated with only humanitarian aids and became an apolitical 
agency in a highly politicized context (Besson 1997, Bocco 2009). Since then, UNRWA has 
provided little more than essential services such as primary health care, social services and 
education. Initially, the lack of integration programs was supported by Palestinian refugees as 
they believed their situation would be temporary (Al Husseini 2000: 52). However, in 
subsequent years, local and international organizations have filled that vacuum and begun 
establishing programs to integrate refugees into the surrounding community (Besson 1997).  
During this time, the State controlled the camps and kept them as temporary spaces. 
For example, entering of any building material to the camps was forbidden (Sayigh 1994). 
Because any solid building within the area of the camps was sign of permanent settlement 
and trigger of integration of them into the Lebanese society. Tight control over the camp and 
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aggressive policy of Chehab’s regime toward Palestinians led to 1969 uprising of the camps’ 
residents against the Lebanese security forces. The PLO and the Lebanese State signed Cairo 
accords1 in the 3 November 1969 and Palestinian guerrilla activities across the Lebanon 
ended and limited to the boundary of the camps (Suleiman 1999: 67).  
To sum up this period, it was apparent that with the presence of the Lebanese 
intelligence, Palestinians had a hard time shaping political movements. While Arab 
nationalist movements were active across the Middle East, the Lebanese legislation was 
against freedom of Palestinians in Lebanon2. However, Palestinians used UNRWA schools 
inside the camps as well as regional support to prepare the ground for the following years of 
revolution and resistance movements. In these years, camps were in the state of exception 
where refugees had no social and political rights and were controlled by the State. So, there 
was a lack of strong political agency of Palestinians inside the camps. 
Second phase: 1968-1982, years of revolution  
This phase is marked by strong presence of the PLO in Lebanon. The PLO 
establishment was announced at the first Palestinian Conference in Jerusalem on 28 May 
1964 3(Al-Natour 1997: 363). The PLO actively operated in Lebanon during the late 1960s. 
However, after they were expelled from Jordan in 1970 they had more active and effective 
                                                 
1 Official version of Cairo Accord never published. But an official version of that published in the Lebanese 
daily newspaper An-Nahar on 20 April 1970. 
2 The time of nakbah met with the nationalist movement in Arab countries. While other Arab nations were 
building their national identity, Palestinians in exile and especially those in the camps were trying to form it. 
Most of the registered Palestinian in camps had rural origin and they clustered in the camps based on village of 
origin, which helped them to facilitate the process of creating national identity in exile (Bocco 2009: 239). 
Although UNRWA, which was more a humanitarian agency during those years, helped them through its 
services like schools. Because, most of teachers in UNRWA schools were Palestinians, they educate new 
generation of pro-Palestinians (Bocco 2009: 239, Peteet 2005, Sayigh 1994).  
 
3 Later in 1974 this organization officially recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people by Arab Summit Conference in Riyadh.  
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role in Lebanon. During the 1960s Palestinian resistance movement, with the aim of unifying 
Palestinians to fight against Israel occupation, operated across the Lebanon which involved 
many political and guerilla organizations. In 1971, Arafat and his supporters defeated the 
local Fatah organization in Beirut and established themselves as the new leader of movement, 
hence the PLO dominated the Palestinian resistance movement (Shiblak 1997: 267). Until the 
departure of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, main headquarters of the PLO and all the 
political groups under its support were located there (Ibid: 268). 
In the early years of displacement in Lebanon, Palestinians were depleted, depressed, 
and incapable of forming a political leadership. However, presence of the PLO along with the 
1969 Cairo Accord had changed these conditions for them. In November 1969, the Cairo 
Accord with the backing of Egyptian President Gemal Abdel Nasser was signed between 
Yassir Arafat and Emile Bustani4. Based on the agreement, the Lebanese government 
accepted an open, armed Palestine presence inside the camps and south of Lebanon. Also, 
control of the sixteen official refugee camps was passed from the Lebanese army to the 
Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (Al-Natour 363, Shiblak 1997: 267). The Cairo 
Accord gave the PLO permission to establish social, economic, legal and political institutions 
for the Palestinian refugees (Ibid).  
However, in reality this agreement led to the presence of a heavily armed and well-
funded PLO. From 1969 to 1982, the camps militarized and permitted the resistance 
movement to launch attacks against Israel from Lebanon (Ghandour 2013; Hanafi and Long 
2010; Peteet 2005). Palestinians remember those years as the “golden age” and the “days of 
revolution” (Peteet 2005:5). The Cairo Accord formalized relationship between the Lebanese 
state and Palestinian refugees, which recognized them as a group in need of collective 
                                                 
4 Emile Bustani was the Lebanese Army Commander-in-Chief.  
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regulation, rights, and some measure of autonomy in Lebanon. The agreement also 
legitimized what was known as the Arafat Trail, a weapons supply route that extended to the 
bases in the south from north Lebanon and Syria. All lead to a level of liberty of Palestinians 
and military control and autonomy over substantial parts of Lebanon. Hence, some argued 
Palestinians created “a state within a state” (Dorai 2010; Peteet 2005, Hanafi and Long 
2012). Such accusations provoked resentment from certain sectors among the Lebanese, 
mainly the Christian Maronite, which largely were represented by the Phalange party (Peteet 
2005: 5-6). 
Furthermore, following the Cairo Accord Palestinians found the opportunity of 
creating a safe base in Lebanon and their own infrastructure. For example, majority of 
Palestinian offices were located in Fakhani region west of Beirut to provide services in the 
field of welfare, health and education (Shiblak 1997:268). Moreover, at least 20,000 jobs 
were created for refugees by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) and the 
Palestinian Martyrs Work Society (SAMED), along with other rehabilitation institutions, as 
well as a chain of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Shiblak 1997: 268). Many 
projects were implemented by the PLO in camps to improve living conditions. The PLO 
forced the Lebanese authorities to accept the building of second and third stories on camp 
dwellings, something which had previously been forbidden. In the absence of basic social 
and economic rights for Palestinian community within the Lebanese legislation, the PLO 
created a new sense of security and a strong political agency. It increased the sense of power 
and confidence for them (Ibid).  
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However, with the all gained power, interests of three groups were threatened: Israeli, 
Syrians and the ruling elite of Lebanon5. Consequently, these groups had united to weaken 
the PLO’s position in Lebanon during the middle of 1970s. In 1974, Israel attacked camps in 
the southern Lebanon where they completely destroyed Nabatyeh camp with heavily air 
strike6. There was military confrontation between the Lebanese Falangist Party and the 
Palestinian militias triggered in 1975. During this period Pro-Syrian Palestinian accelerate 
the tension perhaps to prepare the ground for direct intervention of Syrians (Shiblak 
1997:266). 1975 marked the beginning of civil war in Lebanon which was aggravated by the 
direct interventions of Syrians and Israelis. In 1976 Christian militia destroyed 3 refugee 
camps in East Beirut including Tal al-Za’tar, Jisr-El-Basha and Dbayeh. All those camps 
except Dbayeh were completely destroyed (Khalidi, 2001: 4).  
To summarize this phase, establishment of the PLO as the representative of 
Palestinians and later the leader of resistance movement, marked a new era for political 
agency of Palestinians in Lebanon. After the first twenty years of difficulty in expressing 
their basic rights, the Palestinians officially took control of the camps after the Cairo Accord. 
This agreement led to a strong political agency of Palestinians even beyond spaces of the 
camps. With the level of freedom, they obtained in these years, Palestinians in Lebanon were 
creating a state within the State. However, their strong political and military activities were 
not favorable for the Lebanese and later they were blamed for initiating the destructive civil 
war. Overall, camps were not in the state of exception anymore and the Cairo Accord turned 
them to extraterritorial spaces with the control of Palestinians. This period ended with the 
departure of the PLO from Lebanon.  
                                                 
5 At the time many Lebanese especially Sunni Muslims and Druze supported Palestinians.  
6 Most of the refugees of this camp were relocated to the ’Ain al-Hilweh camp. 
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Third phase: 1982-1990, Years of Wars 
The PLO was expelled from Lebanon following the Israel invasion and just before the 
Sabra and Shatila massacre in 1982. Palestinian refugees lost their support against Islamic 
groups and Christians Maronite in Lebanon. In lack of the PLO, camps became exposed and 
vulnerable (Peteet 2005: 151). Thus, the Christian right-wing militiamen, coordinated and 
supported by Israel, entered into the Sabra and Shatila camp. In three days, they killed 800 to 
3,000 Palestinians and Lebanese civilians. Two years later, the war of the camps made life 
more difficult for refugees.  
During the presence of the PLO in Lebanon, Amal was provoked by the PLO military 
and political actions. This group initiated a war known as the war of the camps between 
1985-1987 to eradicate all guerrilla movements inside the camps. Amal was a pro-Syrian 
Shi’a group that attacked camps in Beirut, Saida and Sour in collaboration with the Lebanese 
Army’s largely Shi’a Sixth Brigade (Peteet 2005: 151). During the war of the camps, many 
refugees and Lebanese civilians were killed or displaced and camps were heavily damaged. 
The purpose of siege was to ensure destruction of the camps and dispersal of refugees so that 
they may never regain political power or autonomy in Lebanon (Peteet 2005: 9; Brynen 
1990: 188). As a result of the war, Palestinian military power declined and the pre-PLO 
marginalization was reestablished. The war of the camps reinstated Palestinians from a major 
political actor in Lebanon into their refugee and helpless statues. Three years of siege of the 
camps exhausted them and food and medical sources were scarce. Finally, they disappeared 
from the Lebanese political scene when they were most vulnerable to abuse and the camps 
reverted from being spaces of active nationalism and resilient agency to spaces of defeat. 
Following the War, in 1987 the Cairo Accord was unilaterally repealed by the Lebanese 
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Chamber of Deputies (Are Knudsen and Hanafi 2009:56). Consequently, Palestinians were 
again subjected to the labor laws that considered them regular foreigners; work permits were 
revoked and the law of reciprocity was again imposed7. Also, building regulations were 
reinstated in 1982 and adding extra floors on top of houses were again forbidden. 
After the Amal’s sieges, a conflict between Palestinian groups in Shatila camp ended 
with the removal of loyalist forces from Beirut and their redeployment in the camps of 
southern Lebanon. “At the end of this period, the camps of southern Lebanon (Rashidiyya, 
al-Bass,BurJal -Shamali, 'Ayn al-Hilwa, and MiehM ieh) were controlled by Fatah and 
loyalist contingents of the PLO, while the camps of Beirut (Burja l- Barajneh, Shatila, and 
Mar Elias) and northern Lebanon (Baddawi and Nahr al-Bared) came under the control of the 
National Security Forces (NSF)-though both groups maintained a presence in all camps. 
Meanwhile, the War of the camps resulted in the withdrawal of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) from the NSF and its alliance with the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)” (Suleiman 1999: 68). 
In 1989, Ta’if agreement ended the fifteen years of the civil war with the support of 
Syria. The agreement systematized the division of power between different Lebanese 
confessions. Because of the power division, Ta’if agreement also clearly stated that there 
shall be no tawteen (naturalization) and Palestinians would remain refugees. Among the 
                                                 
7 In the Lebanese legislative system, Labor law is guided by principle of reciprocity which means “the 
Lebanese will grant foreign workers their rights in Lebanon in accordance to what right would be granted to 
Lebanese workers in their respective countries”. As Palestinians do not have a state this law keep them away 
from working in Lebanon. The Lebanese labor law defines three work options for foreign workers, “these are 
either work by membership in a syndicate, or work by attaining a work permit, or work where no permit is 
required.” Every year Minister of Labor revise the job which are allowed or prohibited to foreign workers. In 
June 2005 Labor minister issued a new decree which exempts Lebanese born Palestinians who are registered 
refugees from approximately 40 to 45 jobs which were previously restricted under Ministerial decision to the 
1964 law Lebanon in accordance to the 1964 foreign labor law (Baraka 2008). 
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Lebanese citizens and politicians tawteen would endanger the sectarian balance and cause 
another civil war (Klait 2010: 26).  
In this phase, Palestinian opponents used the power vacuum created after the 
expulsion of the PLO and weakened the position of Palestinians in Lebanon. As a result, they 
became helpless refugees in ruined camps left after the civil war. Thus the agency of 
Palestinians declined and state of siege reinforced itself. First Israeli and right-wing Christian 
Maronite and later Amal forces entered into the spaces of the camps and violated the Cairo 
Accord and disputed extraterritoriality of the camps as well. The state of siege imprisoned 
the camps residents to their borders and controlled them hence state of exception emerged 
again. 
Fourth phase: 1990-Present, years after the civil war 
Tai'f agreement (1989), Madrid peace conference (1991), and the Israeli-PLO Oslo 
accords (1993) were some of the main events which influenced the presence of the refugees 
in Lebanon after the civil war. 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War and 2007 Nahr al-Bared camp 
shelling were more contemporary major events in Lebanon related to the issue of refugees. 
Beside these, every change in the political scene of Lebanon have been affecting the refugee 
status as well. After the long civil war, Lebanese blamed Palestinians as cause of the war.  
For many Lebanese, camps especially in south like ‘Ain al-Hilweh have been places "beyond 
the reach of law" (Suleiman 1999: 71). For example, in 1990s a series of assassinations and 
counter assassinations happened. The suspects hid in the camps out of the hand of Lebanese 
officials. Thus, the Lebanese Media and some politicians called this situation "security 
islands" that recall camps as places outside the authority of the state (Suleiman 1999: 71-72).  
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There have been many legal restrictions for Palestinians after the civil war. "The first 
example of post-war legal discrimination against Palestinian refugees was their exemption 
from the General Amnesty Law. As part of Lebanon’s post-war settlement, in 1991 the 
parliament passed the General Amnesty Law (Law 94/91), which ensured immunity against 
war crimes for militia leaders-turned-politicians. The law granted amnesty for all crimes 
committed by militias and armed groups before March 28, 1991. The law provided immunity 
to the Lebanese citizens, but excluded non-citizens such as Palestinian refugees. 
Consequently, Palestinians fearing prosecution were forced into hiding. A few were singled 
out for political reasons and sentenced to death in absentia. This meant that for refugees, the 
war was not over and unlike Lebanese citizens, they lacked legal protection against 
prosecution for wartime crimes and atrocities (Are Knudsen and Hanafi 2009: 57).  
In this period, a conflict between Hezbollah and Israel began on July 12, 2006 and 
lasted for 34 days which affected mostly Palestinian refugees in the South of Lebanon. The 
war took place in southern Lebanon in Tyre and villages around it and near the Israeli border 
as well as in the three refugee camps of the south: El Buss (1.5km from Tyre), Rashidiyeh 
(5km from Tyre) and Burj Shemali (3km from Tyre). As a result of this war, the camps in 
South became more isolated while their inhabitants were unable to access supplies as leaving 
the camps became dangerous. Many camp residents left the three camps and moved to the 
Sidon camps. On August 9, 2006, the Israeli Defense Force air strikes hit ’Ain al-Hilweh 
refugee camp in Sidon, killing 2 and injuring 10 people. It is estimated that 75% of the 
inhabitants of Wavel Camp in Baalbeck left the camp (UNRWA 2006). About 47% of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon lived outside the camps, thus were in the same situation as 
the Lebanese people. Some Palestinian refugees fled to Syria. UNRWA estimates that 16,000 
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Palestinian refugees were displaced as a result of the hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel 
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006).  
To sum up, after the civil war, discrimination legislation not only has changed but 
increased. For example, in 1993 and 1995 the number of professions forbidden to 
Palestinians increased. In 2005, the Minister of Labor and Agriculture signed a bill that lifted 
the ban on manual and clerical jobs, but did not amend laws relating to high level 
professions. The prohibitive effects of these laws can be seen in the low number of work 
permits issued. For instance, in 2006, 225 permits were renewed but none were issued. In 
2007 only 28 new permits were issued and only 113 were renewed. In 2008 only one new 
permit was issued and in 2009 only 32 were issued and 67 renewed. Furthermore, although 
the reciprocity law was amended to exclude Palestinians from the general labor reciprocity 
law, they are still barred from more than thirty syndicated professional fields that have their 
own regulations, including the Lebanese nationality and the reciprocity clause. These 
professions include, but are not limited to, doctors, pharmacists, travel agents, news editors, 
engineers and architects (Hanafi et all 2011:43, 45).  
In addition to labor restrictions, in 2001, Palestinian refugees were forbidden from 
acquiring property in Lebanon and Presidential Decree 296 of March 2011 added the 
restriction that they cannot bequeath property already owned. In this amendment, it was 
clearly stated that individuals for whom acquiring land would facilitate tawteen are forbidden 
from owning or bequeathing property. This is considered a direct attack on refugees and as 
yet another measure designed to entrench their marginalization. In 2005, the Lebanese 
government, under pressure from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
created the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee to serve as a platform for cooperation 
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between Lebanese and Palestinian parties and to work with UNRWA to improve the situation 
of refugees. While Lebanese law continues to marginalize refugees, the spread of civil 
society and the improved perception of Palestinians among many Lebanese have re-
politicized refugees. Hence, refugee communities are presently more vocal about their 
national identities and about demanding better rights in Lebanon. After the civil war, state of 
exception has intensified while the refugees are more in need for jobs and aids for 
reconstruction of their houses and infrastructures inside the camps. The discriminative laws, 
like labor law and prohibition of entering building materials to the camps along with many 
other forms of discriminations have tightened the condition for refugees.  
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THREE CAMPS: THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL BORDERS 
In order to being able to support argument of this research, case study research 
methods is used. This method with the cases that is chosen, fit the model of this research. 
Three camps among twelve registered refugee camps are studied to discuss the argument of 
this thesis. In this regard, information related to these camps are gained with the extensive 
published research in this area and related to Palestinian refugees. Books, articles, 
newspapers, interviews and documentaries are used for gathering information. In this section, 
I will explain three refugee camps in Lebanon and production of their spaces in Lebanon.  
As mentioned before, during the Israel-Arab conflict in 1948 many Palestinians fled 
to neighborhood countries and around 100,000 of them settled in Lebanon. During the last 
sixty-five years, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have played various roles in the complex 
political and social history of the region. Today Palestinian refugees in Lebanon constitute 
around ten percent of population of the country (UNRWA 2014; Hanafi et al. 2012). 
Of the sixteen camps that were created in aftermath of the war, today, there are 
twelve registered refugee camps in Lebanon. When Palestinians arrived in Lebanon they 
divided based on a particular social status: urban and rural origin. Those urban Palestinians 
with movable capital and social, kinship or business relation in Lebanon they settled in urban 
areas. They could afford rent a house and started businesses. Most of Palestinians which 
ended in camps they were peasant with few resources and little education (Peteet 2005 106).  
Peteet defines the condition of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon through the notion of 
“production of space” and explains the materiality of the political forces in spaces of the 
camps. At first glance, camps were places to provide temporary shelter, livelihood, and 
protection for a displaced population in the host community. Refugees have made their own 
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mark on camps and created meaningful places while they have lived in exile and planned for 
the future. In Lebanon, Palestinian refugee camps were not always sites of control in a 
disciplinary regime; quite contrary, for a lengthy period, they were controlled and 
administered by the PLO. Spatially they were organized to reproduce the space Palestine left 
behind and to which they were organizing to return. Each of the Palestinian refugee camps in 
Lebanon experienced significant level of control and management; however, uneasily with an 
international relief regime. Peteet explained refugees created meaningful places in the camp 
that is their identity and subjectivity, which she called “landscape of hope for the future”. 
The Palestinian resistance movements, the Lebanese State, and the international institutions 
as external forces obligated some physical barriers on camps. In each camps refugees shaped 
political agency from the early age of exile to post civil war in Lebanon (Peteet 2005: 30-31).  
The Lebanese, from beginning declared the temporariness of Palestinians in Lebanon 
and rejected any citizenship to them. For them not only naturalization jeopardized 
confessional structure by adding a large number of mostly Sunni Muslims also it contradicted 
with the right to return. Lebanon refused to give civil, social and economic rights to the 
Palestinians and regarded them in law as foreigners. Lebanon refused to apply the League of 
Arab States Protocol of 1965 which called for host Arab states to afford Palestinian refugees 
the same rights as their own citizens (Shiblak 1997).However, during 1950 and 1960, around 
50,000 Palestinians, mostly Christians, were naturalized to increase the population of 
Christians (Haddad 2000: 4). President Camille Chamoun (1952 - 1958), a Maronite 
Christian, favored naturalizing Christian Palestinians and Muslims who were connected to 
his political allies. In other words, even all Palestinians did not treated the same way. They 
discriminated between urban Palestinians, Christians and wealthy ones who settled in cities 
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with rural Muslim Palestinians who settled in the camps (Peteet 2005, Shiblak 1997: 262, 
Sayigh 1994).  
The location of the camps was related to the logic of Lebanese sectarianism, 
economic factors, and political strategies (Sayigh 1994: 25). Palestinians spread all over the 
Lebanon and the United Nations founded camps in places that was more concentration of 
refugees’ population or in the areas with available land for leasing. Usually, Palestinians left 
their villages with family and relatives and they stayed together. When a group settled in a 
camp they sent messages to other relatives and people in their village to join them. Morevore, 
the camps in east Beirut, like Tel al-Za’tar, ḍhabīah and Jisr al-Basha, stablished in largely 
Muslim regions. Other camps formed in areas with considerable agricultural activity such as 
B’albak, Tripoli, Saida, Sour, and Nabatiyyeh. Later borders declared as military zone and 
refugees were forced to move to other camps from areas close to the borders. “Subsequent 
movement were closely tied to availability of work, possibilities of reuniting with kin and 
villagers, and access to the camps offering education, medical care, and an efficient and 
routinized rations distribution” (Peteet 2005:107).  
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In this thesis, I will focus on three main camps: Shatila, ’Ain al-Hilweh and Nahr al-
Bared. Between all the twelve refugee camps in Lebanon, these three camps have been 
playing important role in case of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. These three camp 
were stablished after nakbah in 1948, Shatila in Beirut, ’Ain al-Hilweh in south of Lebanon 
close to the Israel and Nahr al-Bared in north along the main highway to the Syria. These 
camps had relatively same conditions until the Cairo Accord8. I will study Shatila camp 
because of its location in Beirut and its role from the beginning to the end of civil war with 
strong political agency. ’Ain al-Hilweh in South constantly have been presenting active 
                                                 
8 The camps grew really fast as a result of population growth, new wave of Palestinian refugees after the 1967 
Israel war and new comers from other camps. 
Figure 1: Location of three camps in Lebanon 
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position in issue of Palestine in the political landscape of Lebanon. Nahr al-Bared will 
represent as an integrated camp to the adjacent area until 20079. In this section, first history 
of each camp will be discussed. Then within a brief description of today’s condition of each 
camp based on UNRWA’s statistic the boundary of the camp will explain.  
Shatila Camp 
Shatila, closest refugee camp to Beirut right outside the municipal borders of the city 
and close to the predominantly Sunni Muslim quarters of Beirut, was built in South of Beirut 
in 1984.  The founder named Abed Bashir was a mujahedeen10 leader who was in Beirut at 
the time Israel closed the border. He erected a tent to settle with twenty members of his 
family because they couldn’t afford to pay rent for rooms in the city of Beirut. He got the 
permission from someone called al-Basha11, without help of Red Cross or UNRWA. After 
receiving twenty tents from UNRWA he gathered people from his village on the same piece 
of land (Sayigh 1994: 35-38). 
Even though refugees considered their settlement in Shatila as temporary, waiting for 
partition or going back to their lands in Palestine, the severe climate conditions such as wind 
and rain made the tents insufficient protection. So they gradually stabilized the tent and later 
replaced it with more permanent material like wooden boards, corrugated iron and flattened-
out petrol cans to make ad-hoc houses. Building with durable/regular building material such 
as cement ceilings were forbidden by the state as they may suggest more permanent status for 
the settlement. The camp was not connected to the city sewage system and any digging for 
private cesspits was forbidden until 1969 (Sayigh 1994: 39-41). 
                                                 
9 This camp in 2007 completely was destroyed by the Lebanese Army. 
10 Guerrilla fighters in Islamic countries, especially those who are fighting against non-Muslim forces. 
11 First Bashir thought he was the land owner. Later they found out the owner was out of the country. 
30 
 
Temporary status of refugees was a reason that the Lebanese state had not provided 
water and housing for Palestinians. UNRWA provided water with trucks which wasn’t 
enough. Water was limited and there were just four public water tanks. Every resident was 
allowed to draw one petrol can of water per day. To manage the distribution a guardian was 
assigned for each tank. There was a lot of difficulties and quarrels over water and this system 
remained until 1969.  One of the residents extended company water from Hayy Farhat to his 
hoe “this was a source that continued to supply water to Shatila during Amal sieges”.( Sayigh 
1995:40) Later this person, Abu Turki brought electricity to the camp because poor residents 
weren’t able to afford it from Sabra. The both ways people have provided water and 
electricity from surrounding neighborhood show one of the key attachment of the camp to the 
other areas was for infrastructure that government haven’t given to them ( Ibid). Meanwhile, 
in this period UNRWA built a clinic, a school and two public latrines. There were few public 
buildings in Shatila, one a very simple mosque and the two cemeteries.  One the cemeteries 
was in Bir Hassan that later became Akka hospital and the other near the pine forest (or 
Horsh) that later partly turned into Martyrs’ Cemetery.  
In the early years (1950s), financial concern was main problem for the refugees. They 
mostly worked as laborers in Beirut in many low-paying jobs. Even they received ration from 
UNRWA it wasn’t adequate for them. Later some of them started to sell some everyday 
items like fruit and vegetables, using the opportunity of closeness to Beirut for providing 
initial materials. First they used a part of their tents for that and later the ground floor of their 
houses as small shops. It was the core of turning Shatila to a commerce area for low income 
urban dwellers.  Furthermore, refugees who had some level of education they were employed 
by UNRWA. But getting a job in UNRWA wasn’t that easy and sometimes it was in the hand 
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of camp’s director. Everyone who had a family tie or connection with director had more 
chance to get one of the local jobs of UNRWA. This connection to director created a sense of 
exclusion for others who were looking for jobs. Although most of the refugees in Shatila 
were farmers back in Palestine, after exile they mostly became urban wage laborers (Sayigh 
1994: 41-45). 
Although it may have looked like a desert to the early settling Palestinians, the area 
surrounding Shatila camp soon developed as city of Beirut was growing. Close to the main 
entrance of Shatila Camp to the South, there was a small sand-hill suitable for spending 
summer evenings outside Beirut to enjoy the cool breeze. City planners saw this area as the 
lung of the city suitable for sport and recreation facilities. Later a sport complex (Shamoun’s 
Sport City) and a horse riding and golf club were built nearby. Furthermore, after moving 
Beirut international airport to the area between Khaldeh and Burj al-Barajnah nine kilometers 
south of Beirut, “a number of politicians and merchants saw the possibilities of the land 
speculation” in the vacated area to the west of the camp (Sayigh, 1994:38). Later, war in 
south of Lebanon in 1976 brought more families escaping the war to settle in the vicinity of 
South of this area. All these factors populated this area and urged growth of it as a commerce 
hub and service distributor intrusions. Also camp’s surrounding settled low-income 
Lebanese, and foreign migrants in low-cost urban housing” (Sayigh1994: 35-38). 
Today, based on UNRWA statistic More than 9,842 registered refugees live in the 
Shatila camp. Most of men work as labors or run grocery stores, and women work as 
cleaners. The camp has two schools and one health center. Environmental health conditions 
in Shatila are extremely bad. Shelters are damp and overcrowded, and many have open 
drains. The sewerage system needs considerable expansion. An infrastructure project is 
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currently being implemented in the camp to upgrade the sewage, the storm water system and 
the water network. Although, unofficial statistics claims up to 22,000 live in the camp and its 
vicinity (UNRWA, 2014). Although, unofficial statistics claims up to 22,000 live in the camp 
and its vicinity (Ibid). After the Syria crisis from 2009 many Syrian refugees have added to 
this numbers. The population had reached about 18,000 before 2011 but since then about 5-
6,000 refugees from Syria have moved into the camp and the surrounding areas (Mackenzie 
2016). These statistic shows how this camp lost its entity as a Palestinian refugee camps 
along with losing its borders and assimilation to the informal urbanization of Beirut.  
Four phases which was defined before had its own mark on Shatila as well. In first 
decade people in this camp were adapting to life in the camp. Later, during the role of the 
Lebanese intelligence all the movement was controlling within the border and entrances of 
the camp. At that time, the camp was in the state of exception while its residents did not have 
any civil rights. During the years of the PLO dominance and specifically with the Cairo 
Accord, 1969-1982, the camp became a significant center in the Palestinian political history 
with a strong agency which jeopardized integrity of the State. With the Cairo accord as an 
international protocol, the camp became an extraterritorial space where Palestinians inside it 
had political and military power. However, the scope of their activities moved beyond the 
camp and the camp’s border virtually expanded. With the departure of the PLO and invasion 
to the camp, state of siege was initiated which shrank the border of the camp to its actual 
border. Today, Shatila has integrated to the city fabric with no visible border while the 
refugees living inside the camp have no agency.  
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Figure2: Shatila camp in Beirut, 2015, photo credit: Bjørnar Haveland 
Nahr Al-Bared Camp 
Nahr al-Bared is the second largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon after ‘Ain 
al-Hilweh. This camp was completely destroyed in 2007 during three month bombing by the 
Lebanese Army following a conflicts with an extremist Islamic group Fateh al-Islam. Nahr 
Al-Bared is located 16 kilometers north of Tripoli next to the highway from Beirut to the 
Syrian border. It is a 20,000 square meters camp home of over 27,000 Palestinian refugees. 
The League of Red Cross Societies stablished the camp in December 1949. The camp is in 
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Akkar region that most of the populations of its villages are Sunni Muslims and 
Maronite Christians (smith, 2009). The initial camp was in north Beqaa away from 
Palestinian-Lebanon border later it relocated to current location. More Palestinians moved to 
camp during 1976 Arab-Israel war and from other destroyed camps in Lebanon during the 
Lebanon Civil War (1975-1990) (CSI 2011: 9). Because camp was built outside of the major 
population center it was more isolated from the Lebanese society compare to the other 
camps. But gradually it turned to a major commercial hub in the Akkar region benefiting 
from the main road to Syria that was passing through the camp and its closeness to Syria 
border (Government of Lebanon 2008).  Nahr Al-Bared were created accidentally at the end 
of 1950. Based on Peteet interview with Samir: 
 “People who settled there were on their way to Syria. When the Syrian government decided 
not to accept any more refugees, the border was closed and they were obliged to stay there. Later, 
UNRWA transformed the site into a camp” (Peteet, 108).  “In 1950s, 90 percent of the people in the 
camp were from Saffuriyya. The camp is bisected by a road that divided it into upper and lower 
levels. The upper level was occupied by the Saffuriyyis and the lower level was a mixture of 
numerous small villages. They were hesitant to come into our areas. Our men would sit in the alleys 
and anyone who passed through who was not from Saffuriyya was asked, “Where are you going?” or 
“Who do you want to see?” They were treated like strangers. This was village behavior. Now the 
camp are more mixed.” (Peteet 2005: 113). 
Later, residents named the main setting of the camp as “historic” camp or “old” camp.  
The old camp was a high-density urban fabric. During 1948-2007, Nahr Al-Bared grew from 
temporary tents to a dense urban fabric house to 20,000 refugees within its limited boundary. 
The adjacent “new camp” started to grow in the late 1970s. Overflow of population settled 
near the camp in areas that people called it new camp. Expansion of the camp housed one 
third population, over 7000, of the Nahr Al-Bared at the time of battle. The adjacent area 
officially and largely were controlled by the jurisdiction of the Muhammara municipality. 
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Still UNRWA provided social and educational services for the adjunct area as well (Sheikh 
Hassan and Hanafi 2010: 31). Later during the reconstruction planning, authorities replaced 
name of this vicinity, new camp, to adjacent area (Hassan 2009). Both the camp and the area 
adjacent to it are located on the land of two Lebanese villages, namely Muhammara and 
Bhanine. Before destruction of the camp, it had an organic pattern of growth, low-rises 
buildings along very narrow streets. The camp had one main central access road and several 
primary streets (Government of Lebanon 2008). The really narrow streets of the camp and 
inaccessibility of it could be one reason for mass shelling of it since Lebanese army could not 
go through the camp to reach militants.   
There wasn’t adequate open community space and infrastructure in the camp. Despite 
of ban on illegal construction and adding stories to the buildings, in lack of enough land for 
expansion people added over two stories to their buildings. In some cases there were 
buildings with six stories. Because the original buildings were built as temporary houses with 
shallow and weak foundations adding more stores to them created vulnerable urban fabric. 
Also, most of the buildings did not have enough natural light and ventilation leading to many 
health problem in the camp. All of these together formed a degraded urban fabric that poor 
economic conditions of dwellers were intensified it in the lack of maintenance (UNRWA 
2008: 17).   
Regardless of poor condition of the camp, Nahr Al-Bared had a major role in 
informal economy compare to other camps. It provided cheaper goods and services not only 
for the residents of the camp, but for Lebanese villages in the region. In addition to being a 
major commercial hub in north of Lebanon, it was a source of cheap labor for the Lebanese 
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agricultural communities close to the camp. Also because it was on the main road to Syria, it 
provided services like repair and maintenance for transportation sector (UNRWA 2008: 17) 
As earlier was mentioned the camp completely destroyed in 2007 during three month 
bombing by Lebanese Army following a conflicts with an extremist Islamic group Fateh al-
Islam. Fateh al-Islam was an organization that announced its formation on November 2006 in 
Nahr al-Bared camp. Although they had not officially approved to be part of Al-Qaeda they 
were ideologically close.  Apparently “they were sent to Lebanon in summer 2006 to form a 
Sunni Jihadist front against Israel to rival of that Shi’ite Hezbollah” (Ramadan 2009: 154). 
Because Nah al-Bared did not have organized security committee like other camps it was a 
safe place for them to shape their organization.  
Nahr al-Bared was one of the camps without army checkpoints for many years. 
Therefore, over six month of Fath al-Islam presence in the camp their position strengthened 
in spite of Palestinian opposition. After arrival of this group, Lebanese army responded to 
their presence with erecting strict checkpoints around the camp. The war began on 19 May 
2007 and after three months of heavily shelling the camp, in September the Lebanese army 
could finally defeat the militant of Fateh al-Islam. In the first few days of battle, the majority 
of camp’s citizen were evacuated and moved to other camps like Beddawi or settled in 
schools, garages and some public buildings. During the battle camp was completely 
destroyed in a manner that Ramadan recalls that as “beyond any possible military necessity 
and deliberate and systematic erasure of the camp” or “urbicide”. He believes this happened 
because the camp is a state of exception which “Lebanese sovereignty and law are not fully 
enforced and a whole range of non-Lebanese actors exercise political power outside the 
control of Lebanese state. Palestinian homes and lives had become sacred in a sense that they 
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could be destroyed without sanction, without resource to legal redress, because there was no 
law” (Ramadan 2009: 154-155). After the conflicts the camp and its adjacent area were 
announced as militarized zone. For residents and visitors of the camp access needed 
permission that were issuing by the Lebanese Army (Hassan 2009: 17). As a result, the 
Lebanese nationals were unable to enter it. The permit system was eventually lifted in 
October 2009 (Ibid).  
This war caused more tension between Lebanese citizens and Palestinian refugees as 
both group suffered from human casualties and economic lost. While all 27000 residents of 
the camp were relocated, Lebanese residents were armed by guns to defend their houses and 
“prevent militants from seeking refuge and melting into the local population” (Dakroub 
2007). During the war at least 168 soldiers and 226 militants were killed. 54 civilians were 
killed in the fighting at the camp and in Tripoli, 47 of them Palestinians. Severity of control 
of the camp has been changing after the end of war. In fact Nahr Al-Bared have turned into a 
test plot for a new approach in Lebanon’s security policy toward Palestinian refugee camps 
(Sheikh Hassan and Hanafi 2010, Smith 2009).  
Although presence of Fateh al-Islam was the recognizable reason for invading the 
camp, other profound political and social events ease the process. Palestinian refugees were 
blamed by Lebanese as cause of fifteen years civil war. With some events like Rafiq Hariri 
assassination in 2005 and withdraw of Syrian troops from Lebanon was experiencing 
political development. But less than a year before Nahr Al-Bared battle, in 2006 Hezbollah 
had a war with Israel.  That war was a measure to show weakness of Lebanese state and army 
over the control of their territory (Sheikh Hassan and Hanafi 2010: 29). 
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The project of bringing camps under control of Lebanese sovereignty have been 
starting from the end of civil war in late 1980s. After the 9/11 and in the rise of extremist 
Islamic group around the region this project revived. The confessional structure of Lebanon 
state and the possibility of disputing balance by adding a considerable Sunni population to 
the country, left the process vague. Nahr Al-Bared battle and its reconstruction had created a 
break to test a new security paradigm.  
Although Lebanese were skeptical about presence of Palestinian refugees generally, 
the relation between Nahr Al-Bared and surrounding areas was opposite to that mindset. In 
fact, this camp as previously mentioned was a main commercial hub in north Lebanon. This 
commercial relationship along with between village marriages built social ties with the 
people in the Akkar region.  
After the war the positive attitudes of both sides have been changed. Palestinians 
consider themselves as victim of the war because they were against presence of Fateh Al-
Islam militants in the camp. Although, both sides had casualties and economic loss, the 
burden on Palestinian side was more extensive as they lost their homes. In the eyes of 
Palestinians the war was a conspiracy against them (CSI 2011). Even Ramadan considered 
that as an opportunity for Lebanese state to eradicate Palestinians by describing the long 
delay on beginning reconstruction of the camp (Ramadan 2009). Based on CSI report, until 
2010, there was an opposition not against Lebanese neighbors of the camp but against the 
state and politicians because Palestinians believe they want to humiliate and isolate them 
(CSI 2011, Ramadan 2009, Hassan and Hanafi 2010).  
The Lebanese army have been organized security actions to control the camp and 
adjacent area directly after the end of the conflict. A social permit to enter the camp was 
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necessitated for both Palestinians and Lebanese. There were security offices that people had 
to walk on to show their documents. Army forces stopped the cars or people to search them. 
These security measures would take a long time for people to go into the camp. It was 
opposite way of easy commuting between the camp and its neighbor prior the war and lead to 
further isolation of the camp. Also it intensify the conflict between Palestinians and Lebanese 
authorities (CSI 2011).  
Nah al-Bared, was an example of a camp that gained its agency through financial 
activities even in the absence of the PLO. From 1970, the camp grew and overflow of its 
population housed in the vicinity of the camp. In fact, with the prosperity of the refugees they 
afforded the land and housing in the adjacent area so the border of the camp practically 
expanded. While, the border of the camp was enlarged beyond its actual border, the 2007 war 
reinforced the actual border. Since then, the camp has been controlling via its border and the 
checkpoints. If the capital of the refugees helped them to form agency, now with reassertion 
of the border they regain their political agency where the extraterritoriality of the camp 
assure them the right to have political agency.  
 ‘Ain al-Hilweh 
‘Ain al-Hilweh with the population of more than 60,000 is the largest Palestinian 
refugee camp in Lebanon. The camp was stablished in 1949 by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross in southern part of the city of Saida. The camp at the beginning settled 
people from villages and towns in northern Palestine like from Saffourieh, al-Sofsaf, 
Tarshiha, Hittin. The camp is in proximity of Mieh Mieh and Darb el-Seem villages in south-
east of old city of Saida. Due to its important socio-political role the camp consider as capital 
of Palestinians in exile.  
40 
 
‘Ain al-Hilweh includes eight neighborhoods, each of them was formed through a 
different process of “encroachment, appropriation, and/or negotiation with the surrounding 
areas that include both squatting (illegal land occupation) and informal land subdivisions” 
(Ghandour 2013). Also the buildings of a public housing know as Ta’meer which was built 
around 1958 by Lebanese government is located the camp. The camp and its adjacent areas 
settled a vast group of Palestinian refugees, poor Lebanese family and recently Syrian 
refugees (Ibid). 
Basically the camp is managed by UNRWA since 1950 but because of its population 
and also its critical geopolitical location in south of Lebanon close to Israel has been playing 
a key role in Life of Palestinians in exile. The camp has frustrated history in seventies when 
camp was center of power for the PLO so it being targeted for demolition in 1980s. In 1982 
Israel invaded the camps and war of the camps by Amal movement happened in 1985. From 
mid 1990s after civil war in Lebanon camps same as city of Saida witnessed a lot of 
extremist movements (UNRWA 2014; Ghandour 2013)  
There is a daily movement between camp dweller and citizens. People go outside for 
school, work, shopping and so on, or the other way round. The mobility is not limited to 
small scale and it happen in a larger scale like migration out of the camp to other cities and 
countries and into the camp for new migrant communities (like low income Lebanese, 
foreign work forces and currently Syrian refugees). All the years of exile led to special 
relation with host community and simultaneously because of the socio-political and legal 
conflicts there is a sense of segregation.  
‘Ain al-Hilweh is located in a strong security zone that was created more than twenty 
years ago. The creation of boundaries of this zone is ambiguous and it gradually have been 
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stablished by checkpoints, barbed wire fences, walls and watchtowers. ‘Ain al-Hilweh is 
surrounded by twelve neighborhoods that could be regarded as its expansion. Ten of these 
neighborhood are inside security zone (that is how the adjacent area suffer from proximity to 
the camps). Urbanization of neighborhoods happened informally in same spatial condition of 
the camp. Most of the population of neighborhood as well as camp are Palestinians with a 
minority of other nationalities. 
 Because the camp has fixed boundary the population growth lead into adding more 
stories in top of the existing buildings and densifying camp and outside the boundary of the 
camp vacant areas became neighborhood with mostly Palestinian dwellers. One of the 
famous neighborhood next to ‘Ain al-Hilweh is Ta‘meer. At first Ta‘meer was a public 
housing project to settle affected people from 1956 earthquake both Palestinian from Sh’him 
and Lebanese who lived in center of Saida.  As increase in population of the camp and 
Ta‘meer people add more stories to the mid-century building blocks. Now this neighborhood 
is a mix of Lebanese- Palestinians who have close relationship to each other rather other 
neighborhood in city of Saida. This neighborhood is one of the places for those who want to 
hide from the state especially for extremists (Ghandour 2013).   
 ‘Ain al-Hilweh as a close camp through its urbanization process created a complex 
condition. In one hand it supposed to limit within its boundary from outside (city of Saida, 
Lebanese) but it expanded to the fabric of city. The condition around the camp is similar to 
the camp in a level that security zone enlarged. Apparently “state of exception” and “bare 
life” spread to the adjacent area even though adjacent area is not camp anymore.  
The Lebanese army controlled entry to the camps and in the check point cars can be 
searched. From 1990s until 2005 entering any building materials to the camps without a 
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previous authorization was forbidden. Toward the end of July 2005, the Lebanese army 
erected roadblocks at most of the entrances to the camp, taking the names of anyone entering 
or exiting and causing long traffic delays. The pretext for the checkpoints was a search for 
the would-be assassins of newly reappointed Defense Minister Elias Murr, who had survived 
an attempt on his life on July 12. Murr claimed to know that the perpetrators were "hiding 
inside Palestinian refugee camps." No one in Ain al-Hilweh or elsewhere has been arrested in 
the case. (Khalili 2005).  
Restriction on entry of building materials to the camp is the main reasons for 
degradation of houses in camps because it limited renovation and maintenance of houses. 
Also young couple cannot build new houses and settle down in the camps. So overflow of 
population had to leave the camps and settled in adjacent area (Dorai, 2010). The security 
zone, presence of military soldiers and physical border around camp are not for controlling 
the camps but they intensify “state of exception”. These checkpoints mark the place of 
stateless where refugees do not have Lebanese citizen’s rights. Also the Lebanese army 
permanently are present on the outskirts of the majority of the refugee camps. When 
attempting to enter refugee camps throughout southern Lebanon, such as ‘Ain al-Hilweh, you 
encounter a series of Lebanese military check-points which control each entry and exit point 
of the camp. These check-points prohibit freedom of movement for Palestinian refugees 
living in the camps (Christoff 2004: 2).  
In Ain al-Hilweh, the current condition is marking up with a strong political agency. 
There are many active fractions in the camp and each neighborhood is controlling by a 
fraction. The struggle between political parties and armed militia is a part of daily life of the 
refugees inside the camp. From the outside, the camp has a strong security boundary which is 
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beyond the actual border of the camp. So the camp is located in the state of exception force 
by the Lebanese State in one hand and its extraterritoriality on the other hand.  
Shatila and ’Ain al-Hilweh became important during the rise of PLO and forming 
resistant organization in the camps. The location of Shatila in Beirut increased its role after 
PLO had to leave Jordan. The security measures and boundary of the camps were changing 
during all the years depend on various factors: state of Lebanon, political condition, relations 
between Lebanon and Israel and relation between Palestinians and Israelis. For example 
during the presence of Deuxieme Bureau in 1950s and 60s control of the camps was more 
intense.  
All the camps had some level of control by Lebanese. Cairo accord create a 
revolutionary ground for the camps. During Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) camps 
were less under the surveillance of state of Lebanon in 1969-1982. The strong presence of 
Palestinians in Lebanon declined with Israel invasion in 1982 and limited PRM and PLO to 
the camps. The battle of the camps had begun on 19 May 1985 and continued until 1987 
mostly were concentrated in center and south of Beirut. Shatila was one of the camps that 
heavily destroyed during Amal sieges.  
After the civil war, Shatila has been integrating to the city fabric. Shatila in spite of its 
location now assimilate to the city fabric and its borders are not physically intense.  ‘Ain al-
Hilweh keep its significance in south and due to its location even today has security control, 
checkpoints, and border. Nahr Al-Bared in north as a physically isolated camp, in the lack of 
security measures under some regional circumstances became a safe place for an extremist 
Islamic group. The Lebanese army shelled the camp in 2007. Reconstruction project of the 
camp was a test plot for a new model of control over the camp. Nahr Al-Bared was a 
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successful camp in terms of shaping an environment for Palestinian refugees to have a 
normal daily life. 2007 massacre completely demolished the camp. For the reconstruction 
program The Lebanese state were more concern with security and they tried to implement 
some elements in the reconstruction plan. Successful or not this part could reveal the attitude 
of Lebanese and the state toward Palestinians in more recent years. In the next part, I will 
discuss the relationship between political agency of Palestinian refugees and the changing 
boundary conditions of the three camps. 
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STATE OF SIEGE 
New technologies of power are taking control of body and life or in Foucault 
terminology politics turn into biopolitcs (Foucault 1997). Refugee camps were produced as 
result of the sociopolitical effects of these forms of power.  In some instances, refugee camps 
have been conceptualized as “total institutions” where bodies are disciplined and control is 
an integral and defining component of the structure of the institution and its daily routine 
(Peteet 2005:29). In many ways, the space of the Palestinian camps has signified a 
mechanism of control for multiple political power. The refugees are expected to remain 
within their boundary where Lebanese army checkpoints can control what goes into the 
camp. The army controls the construction activity by allowing or not allowing building 
materials to enter the camp at any time. It is an environment under continuous potential 
siege. For example, when the Amal forces in conjunction with the Syrian regime started a 
war against Palestinians in 1985, they actually closed access to the camps using the same 
checkpoints that the army and the PLO used to control the security of the camps. The border 
and the checkpoints were already in place, Amal only activated the state of siege by closing 
access of goods through these checkpoints. Living under potential siege is manifested 
differently among the three camps. While Shatila camp is mostly integrated with neighboring 
areas like Sabra neighborhood in Beirut, ‘Ain al-Hilweh had a major impact on urbanization 
in Saida where the old city and the camp are now connected through a series of 
neighborhoods and institutional buildings. Nahr al-Bared on the other hand, which is situated 
in the countryside in northern Lebanon, became the urban hub for the region, which is seen 
within its original boundaries and the fabric that developed around it. These three camps 
show very different condition of integration. In the following section, I will discuss the 
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political agency of Palestinians in relation to the dynamics of borders, which defined the 
spatial assimilation of the camps within the surrounding spatial fabric of the Lebanese state.  
Expansion and Consolidation of the Boundaries 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon have had fixed boundaries since their 
establishment. The camps usually occupy limited space, which was designated areas by the 
Lebanese state, situated on available public land or on private land leased from local 
landowners by the state or UNRWA. Although the camps have had fixed geographic limits, 
the visibility of their boundaries differed from one camp to another and from one period to 
another. The definition of visible boundary in this research is any form of human-made 
barrier, which marks and highlights the political boundary of the camp. In other words, any 
fences, barbed wire, walls, check points, and solid barriers that mark the space of the camp 
and makes its boundary visible. The configuration of the boundary reflects the power of 
Lebanese state over the camp residents and their means of surveillance and control over the 
spaces of the camps. These borders mark extraterritorial spaces since, from the perspective of 
the Lebanese state, the camps are considered outside-sites where different legal and political 
regulations apply. Hence, the visible boundary of the camps, such as the gateways, 
checkpoints, and entries, define the transition into a different form of citizenship and its 
respective rights.  
In the first ten years of exile (1948-1958), Palestinian were adapting their life into the 
spaces of the camps. The cultural similarities between the Palestinians and the Lebanese 
helped refugees to build social relationships with their host community soon after the camp’s 
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establishment12. During this period, the Lebanese did not see the presence of the refugees as 
a threat; hence they were more hospitable towards them. This period was a transformation 
phase for Palestinians as they adjusted to the spaces of the camps based on their needs and 
the resources they received from humanitarian agencies. Also, re-socialization happened 
through cultural and social relationship with other refugees and Lebanese neighbors through 
daily life and intermarriages (Agier 2008:71-81). This condition was common between the 
camps all over Lebanon as they were reestablishing their cultural identity after the traumatic 
event of exile. Gradually, the camps moved forward from temporary settlement to “city-
camps” with formation of political agency and urban sociability with extensive financial 
activities. Toward the end of 1960s with the formation of Palestinian resistance movement, 
spaces of the camps were centers for the political and military organizations to attract 
Palestinians.  
The first stage of monitoring the camps’ border took place at the end of President 
Camille Chamoun era and with the new government headed by General Fuad Chehab in 
1958. During this period, the Palestinian resistance movement and Arab nationalist 
movement in the region were active, which concerned the pro-western government of 
Lebanon about the rising political activities inside the camps. Thus, the Lebanese 
intelligence, Deuxieme Bureau, monitored every movement within the camps, which limited 
the refugees’ freedom of expression and their political and social activities (Sayigh 1994, 
Suleiman 1999). During this period, and for the first time, the boundary of camps were 
controlled through checkpoints, which constrained the refugees’ political agency. At the time 
(1960s), control over Palestinians went beyond the border of the camps. They did not have 
                                                 
12 . For example, Shatila people developed a social relationship with adjacent Lebanese neighborhoods while 
extending infrastructural services, such as electricity and water, from these neighborhoods like Hayy Farhat and 
Sabra. 
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the right to work in many professions, their movement between the camps and to the other 
countries was controlled, and entering building materials into the camps and adding new 
stories was prohibited. With monitoring the border of the camps, production of political 
agency and its scope of effects took a new form. For Palestinians, during this “dark age”, 
“the Lebanese authorities were cast as enemies whose task was to prevent political 
organizing, monitoring signs of permanency in the camps, and to keep the refugee politically 
and spatially constrained" (Peteet 2005: 129). Political condition after 1958 resulted in 
transforming the dynamics of the camps. Between the years of 1958 through 1969, the State 
was successful in controlling the camps via their borders. However, this changed with the 
increasing presence of the PLO in Lebanon overtime. 
In the 1960s, the PLO was operating in both Lebanon and Jordan; however, they 
established their headquarters in Lebanon in 1970 when they were expelled from Jordan. 
Establishing their headquarters in Lebanon and as the result of the Cairo Accord agreement 
the PLO increased their political and military activities in Lebanon during the 1970s. The 
PLO provided infrastructure for the camps with financial support of Arab Gulf countries. The 
presence of the PLO in Lebanon with its military, political and financial resources changed 
the political agency of Palestinians in Lebanon centered within the camps. By the end of 
1960s, refugees that were under surveillance of the Deuxieme Bureau before, found the 
opportunity to claim their basic rights. Many Palestinians joined political and military 
organizations that were operating freely during this time in the camps. With the political and 
military power that Palestinians obtained, they were able to expand the camps and have more 
influence on the Lebanese territory. Moreover, with the flow of the capital, which the PLO 
brought to the camps, Palestinian started investing in buildings in the areas adjacent to the 
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camps. The camp became the provider of urban infrastructure not only within its boundary 
but for the surrounding neighborhoods. In this period, the boundary practically vanished and 
the camps became the center. The Cairo accord in 1969, not only let refugees to have military 
activities inside the camps, it lifted the other sanctions against Palestinians (Peteet 2005). The 
main goal of the Cairo accord for the Lebanese side was limiting Palestinian political and 
military activities to the camps’ border. However, the results of the Cairo accord actually 
contributed to the expansion of the camps. This allowed an increase in Palestinian political 
agency with the support of the PLO, which empowered Palestinians to transform spaces of 
the camps. This transformation extended radius of their influence beyond the camp’s limit.  
During this period of transformation, Shatila was one of the camps that had its 
boundary integrated into the neighborhoods in South of Beirut. Sabra, a neighborhood north 
of Shatila, housed the overflowing Palestinian population of the camp as well as low income 
non-Palestinians13. Shatila extended its border with the strong political agency that was 
created during the PLO control period. The camp played an important role at the time due to 
its proximity to the PLO administration district in neighboring Fakhani where the 
organization west Beirut headquarters were.  
The disappearance of the boundary was also manifested in Nahr Al-Bared through 
informal commercial activity. This camp was built outside of the major population center 
because it was geographically more isolated from major Lebanese cities compared to the 
other camps. Situated in one of the poorest regions of Lebanon, the camp gradually turned to 
a major commercial hub in Akkar region benefiting from the main road to Syria that was 
                                                 
13 Officially, Sabra was not part of Shatila camp, but because of its social and spatial integration with the camp, 
it was targeted together with Shatila camp during the massacre and the war of the camps in 1982 and 1984 
respectively. 
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passing through the camp and its closeness to Syria border (Government of Lebanon 2008)14.  
It was one of the camps without army checkpoints for many years; even after Palestinian 
organizations lost their military presence after the departure of the PLO.   
Unlike the other camps that lost their political agency in the absence of the PLO, this 
camp, through commercial dominance, acquired similar conditions. Accordingly, the camp 
expanded through Palestinian capital but also within its context. Because of the power of 
capital in a region which is completely deprived this camp became the hub of the 
consumption within the region. Therefore, whenever Palestinians had political agency or 
capital, the boundary vanished while they became dominant over Lebanese communities.   
However, it has not been always favorable for Palestinians when boundaries 
disappear. Borders vanish when the state actually entered into the camps to take control of 
the space of the camps. One example is the case of Sabra and Shatila Massacre and the war 
of the camps15. The massacre and war of the camps left Shatila camp with enormous 
                                                 
14 The adjacent “new camp” started to grow in the late 1970s. Regardless of its poor condition, Nahr Al-Bared 
camp played a major role in the informal economy of its region compared to other camps. It provided cheaper 
goods and services not only for its residents, but for Lebanese villages in the region. In addition to being a 
major commercial hub in north of Lebanon, it was a source of cheap labor for the Lebanese agricultural 
communities close to the camp. Also, because it was on the main road to Syria, it provided services like repair 
and maintenance for the transportation sector as well (UNRWA 2008: 17). 
15 It started with the end of an era which Palestinian refugees remember as “golden years” and “years of 
revolution” which took place between 1969-1982. In 1975, the Lebanese civil war began and they became 
suspicious of refugee’s presence in Lebanon. Years of openness toward the camps was encroached in 1976 with 
invasion of Israel and right-wing Christian Maronite. Even four camps, namely Tal al-Za’tar, Jisr-El-Basha and 
Dbayeh in East Beirut and Nabatiyeh in southern Lebanon, were destroyed during different armed battles and 
the refugees were forced to move to the other camps. In 1982 the tension had mounted between Palestinians 
military organizations and political parties with the Lebanese counterparts. Israel attacked south of Lebanon in 
June and soon the PLO were expelled from Lebanon. Palestinians refugees lost their support against both 
Lebanese Islamic groups and Christians Maronite. (Peteet 2005: 151). Christian right-wing militiamen, who 
coordinated with and supported by Israel, entered into Shatila. During the three day massacre, they killed 800 to 
3,000 Palestinians and Lebanese civilians. For the camp’s expansion, the proximity was not beneficial anymore 
and in fact it was detrimental. For example, Sabra which was an informal settlement north of Shatila, was 
bombarded during the massacre and later during the war of the camps because of its proximity. With Sabra and 
Shatila massacre, the State took the control and entered to the spaces of the camp.  
War of the camps in 1985-1987, interrupted political agency of Palestinians more and border of the camps 
forced to shrink and vanish. Inside the Shatila camp, some Shi’a families were living next to their Sunni 
neighbors. There wasn’t any religious conflict between these two groups until war of the camps. This war was 
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damages. Shatila camp never recovered its boundary after the massacre and war of the 
camps. Palestinians in Shatila lost all political agency until nowadays where a significant part 
of the camp is inhabited by non-Palestinian16. Shatila is an example of a camp that had 
invisible border during its rise and then decline. The political agency of its inhabitants 
peaked during the period of strong military presence of the PLO, and drastically diminished 
when this military presence disappeared. The lack of physical borders, made Shatila camp 
more vulnerable than others in losing its integrity as a space for Palestinian citizenship and 
agency. When the military dominance of Palestinians diminished, the space of the Lebanese 
state with its corresponding juridical-political structure took over the space of the camp and 
consumed the political agency of its Palestinian inhabitants.  
Such a process can also be traced in the aftermath of the battle of the Lebanese Army 
with Fateh al Islam in Nahr Al-Bared in 2007. Upon entering the camp to chase the mostly 
non-Palestinian fundamentalist group, the Lebanese army systematically destroyed all the 
buildings within the official boundary of the camp (Ramadan 2010). The camp space was 
considered devoid of any “right to exist.” The right to space is annihilated to a condition that 
resembles the conditions of bare life that Agamben articulates. During three months of siege, 
shelling the camp and its adjacent areas resulted in reassertion of the border of the camp. The 
camp residents that were displaced outside the camp lost any voice to assert their right to 
their space. This condition gradually changed during the reconstruction phase with the 
presence of international agencies that were backing the reconstruction efforts of the camp. 
                                                                                                                                                       
actually between Shi’a Amal group with back of Syria against Sunni Palestinians. Amal wanted to remove 
remaining of PLO’s patron and their allies from the camps. As war began, most of the Shi’as inside the camps 
left their houses either to help their Shi’a fellows or to not participate in the war against their former Sunni 
neighbors (Sayigh 1994). 
16 Like low-income Lebanese, immigrants and more recently Syrian refugees and Palestinians refugees fled 
from Syria.  
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During this process the displaced families were moving back into the camp borders, which 
are now highly secured and militarized. During its siege, Nahr al-Bared camp went into the 
state of exception where the Lebanese army allowed the annihilation of all forms of life 
within the camp disregarding any judicial or legal framework (Ramadan 2009: 154-155). 
Similar to Shatila camp, Nahr al-Bared Palestinian inhabitants lost their political agency 
when the Lebanese army presence in the camp expanded the space of the Lebanese state and 
disregarded the extraterritoriality of the camp. Since the boundaries were physically 
reestablished and militarized, Palestinians that returned to the camp are regaining their 
political agency and representation within these new hard boundaries.  
‘Ain al-Hilweh camp has retained physically controlled and militarized boundaries 
similar to the current conditions of Nahr al-Bared camp, soon after the PLO left Lebanon. 
The creation of boundaries of the security zone is ambiguous and it gradually have been 
established by checkpoints, barbed wire fences, walls and watchtowers that enclosed the 
official camp with several adjacent areas17. Having strong physical and militarized 
boundaries for an extended period of time, ‘Ain al-Hilweh is also the stronghold of 
Palestinian political presence in Lebanon. The presence of strong political agency in this 
camp is spatially apparent where every neighborhood is controlled by a specific party or 
private militia (Ghandour 2013). Through its expansion, the camp has expanded its 
extraterritorial space by pushing the security boundary to include the expanded adjacent 
areas. With the expansion of the extraterritorial space, the space of political agency and 
                                                 
17 ‘Ain al-Hilwah is surrounded by twelve neighborhoods that could be regarded as its expansion. Ten of these 
neighborhood are inside the security zone. Urbanization of most of these neighborhoods happened informally 
similar to the spatial condition of the camp. The majority of the population of these neighborhoods as well as 
the camp are Palestinians with several Lebanese and non-Lebanese minorities (Ghandour 2013). 
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citizenship of the Palestinians has expanded as they control more land outside the camp 
official boundary in which they can exercise their politics.  
For the Palestinians living in Lebanon, the space outside the camp boundaries is state 
of exception where they have practically no political agency or civic rights. Accordingly, the 
strong physical boundaries, such as the boundary of the security zone in ‘Ain al-Hilweh, has 
retained a space of citizenship and political agency with the larger space of the Lebanese 
state. The Lebanese army controlled entry to the camp and in the checkpoint cars can be 
searched, however the Lebanese army stays outside the boundary of the camp security zone. 
For many Lebanese, Palestinian refugee camps especially in south like ‘Ain al-Hilweh have 
been places "beyond the reach of law" (Suleiman 1999: 71). Lebanese Media and some 
politicians called this situation "security islands" that recall camps as places outside the 
authority of the state (Suleiman 1999: 71-72). Based on this analysis these extraterritorial 
“security islands” may also be considered spaces of citizenship and political agency in a 
landscape of the “state-of-exception” of the Lebanese state. Palestinians in ‘Ain al-Hilweh 
have been obtaining compelling political agency inside the camp as well as Palestinian in 
Nahr al-Bared following the establishment of its boundaries.  This extraterritorial space of 
citizenship is threatened or destroyed when the physical boundaries of the camp are not 
present, such as the post-1984 Shatila camp and pre-2007 Nahr al-Bared camp. For 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the extraterritorial space of the camp is the locus of their 
political agency and their protection from shifting into the state of exception of the official 
space of the Lebanese state. 
Based on these three case studies, the political agency of Palestinians in Lebanon has 
been strongly manifested when the camp has visible and highly secured boundary or when 
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they had military and/or commercial power. Within the established boundaries, the political 
agency of Palestinians is secured through international legislation that gives them self-
representation. These “extraterritorial and exceptional spaces” that are out of the Lebanese 
state law, grant them political rights in accordance with formal international protocols. Even 
though, Palestinians have been able to gain authority and political agency through military 
power (pre 1982 PLO presence in Lebanon) or commercial power (pre-2007 Nahr al-Bared), 
their presence as political subjects have been secured through the strong physical and 
militarized boundaries that preserves extraterritorial spaces, of their camps, within the state 
of Lebanon.  
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CONCLUSION 
Borders of the camps represent the shifting power scale between the camps and host 
spaces. While the Lebanese authorities have been trying to confine spaces of the camps, the 
camps’ borders have indicated everlasting efforts of the refugees over forming political 
agency and claiming civil rights. In fact, these boundaries define the inclusion and exclusion 
of Palestinians in relation to their context. The juxtaposition of spaces of the camps to their 
surroundings, regarding the daily activity and political and social landscape of the camps 
have generated obscured condition within the borders. When Palestinians were dominant, 
whether with political, finical or military power, the borders moved beyond actual border of 
the camps. In contrary, when the State took the control, the visible boundary shrink and the 
refugees lose their agency.  
However, camps are spaces out of the state law, Palestinian refugee camps are an 
example of perpetual claim over right to exist. These three cases, subject of this thesis, show 
how conditions vary due to complicated sociopolitical circumstances which create spaces of 
the camps. The Lebanese State wanted to keep Palestinians in the state of exception while 
Cairo Accord as an international protocol created an extraterritorial spaces in contrast. The 
refugees inside these extraterritorial spaces like case of ‘Ain al-Hilweh have found the 
opportunity of forming political agency which is against desire of the host state. So as earlier 
was discussed not all of the camps are necessarily in the state of exception, but quiet contrary 
their extraterritorial spaces let them to have political agency inside the camps.  
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APPENDIX: THE CAIRO ACCORD (1969)  
On Monday, 3rd November 1969, the Lebanese delegation headed by Army 
Commander General Emile al-Bustani, and the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation, 
headed by Mr. Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the organization, met in Cairo in the presence of 
the United Arab Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Riyad, and the War Minister, 
General Muhammad Fawzi. 
In consonance with the bonds of brotherhood and common destiny, relations between 
Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution must always be conducted on the bases of 
confidence, frankness, and positive cooperation for the benefit of Lebanon and the 
Palestinian revolution and within the framework of Lebanon's sovereignty and security. The 
two delegations agreed on the following principles and measures: 
The Palestinian Presence 
It was agreed to reorganize the Palestinian presence in Lebanon on the following bases: 
1. The right to work, residence, and movement for Palestinians currently residing in 
Lebanon; 
2. The formation of local committees composed of Palestinians in the camps to care for the 
interests of Palestinians residing in these camps in cooperation with the local Lebanese 
authorities within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty; 
3. The establishment of posts of the Palestinian Armed Struggle [PASC] inside the camps for 
the purpose of cooperation with the local committees to ensure good relations with the 
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Lebanese authorities. These posts shall undertake the task of regulating and determining the 
presence of arms in the camps within the framework of Lebanese security and the interests of 
the Palestinian revolution; 
4. Palestinians resident in Lebanon are to be permitted to participate in the Palestinian 
revolution through the Armed Struggle and in accordance with the principles of the 
sovereignty and security of Lebanon. 
Commando Activity 
It was agreed to facilitate commando activity by means of: 
1. Facilitating the passage of commandos and specifying points of passage and 
reconnaissance in the border areas; 
2. Safeguarding the road to the 'Arqub region; 
3. The Armed Struggle shall undertake to control the conduct of all the members of its 
organizations and [to ensure] their non-interference in Lebanese affairs; 
4. Establishing a joint command control of the Armed Struggle and the Lebanese Army; 
5. Ending the propaganda campaigns by both sides; 
6. Conducting a census of Armed Struggle personnel in Lebanon by their command. 
7. Appointing Armed Struggle representatives at Lebanese Army headquarters to participate 
in the resolution of all emergency matters; 
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8. Studying the distribution of all suitable points of concentration in border areas which will 
be agreed with the Lebanese Army command; 
9. Regulating the entry, exit, and circulation of Armed Struggle personnel; 
10. Removal of the Jiyrun base. 
11. The Lebanese Army shall facilitate the operation of medical, evacuation, and supply 
centers for commando activity; 
12. Releasing detained personnel and confiscated arms; 
13. It is understood that the Lebanese authorities, both civil and military, shall continue to 
exercise all their prerogatives and responsibilities in all areas of Lebanon in all 
circumstances; 
14. The two delegations affirm that the Palestinian armed struggle is in the interest of 
Lebanon as well as in that of the Palestinian revolution and all Arabs; 
15. This agreement shall remain Top Secret and for the eyes of the commands only. 
Head of Lebanese delegation 
Emile Bustani 
Head of Palestinian delegation 
Yasir 'Arafat 
Resolution adopted by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, 21 May 1987 
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1. Abrogation of the law issued by the Chamber of Deputies on 14 June 1983, 
authorizing the Government to ratify the agreement signed by the Government of the 
Lebanese Republic and the Government of the State of Israel on 17 May 1983. 
2. The agreement signed on 3 November 1969 between the head of the Lebanese 
delegation General Emile Bustani and the Chairman of the PLO and which is known 
as the "Cairo Agreement" is hereby null and void as if it had never existed. Further, 
all annexes and measures related to the Cairo Agreement are hereby null and void as 
if they had never existed. 
3. This law will become effective upon its publication in the Official Gazette. 
 
